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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CECELIA BEA SCAFIDE,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

Lower Court Civil No. 914903785DA
Case No. 930276-CA

JAMES WAYNE SCAFIDE,

Priority Classification 15

Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPELLANT (hereinafter "defendant" or "husband") submits the
following as his reply brief in support of his appeal in the abovereferenced action:

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES. STATUTES and RULES
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may be
determinative of the outcome in this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties to this action apparently agree that the standard
of review is for an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court.

Birch

v.

Birch,

771

P. 2d

appellee's brief, at pp 1 and 2 ) .

1114

(Utah Ct. App. 1989;

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court abused its discretion in failing to

set aside the decree of divorce and judgment entered against the
defendant/appellant.

The trial court's failure to set aside the

decree of divorce and judgment was an abuse of discretion for the
following reasons:
a.

the defendant had not been represented at any prior

stage in the proceedings by independent counsel; and
b.

there was substantial evidence on file at the time

the decree of divorce was entered that the defendant was not
competent to stipulate to a decree of divorce in his own
behalf; and
c.

there was substantial evidence before the trial

court in support of the defendant's motion for relief from
judgment to the effect that the plaintiff had perpetrated a
fraud against the defendant by assuring him that the divorce
was merely a sham, to protect the parties' assets from
contingent liabilities created by a driving incident in which
the defendant had been involved, and that the plaintiff
continued to treat the defendant as her husband until over six
months after the entry of the decree of divorce.

2

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT ENTERED
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
The procedural facts in this case are not substantially in
dispute.

The parties signed a stipulation, the plaintiff being

represented by counsel and the defendant acting pro se.

The trial

court waived the ninety-day waiting period and permitted a decree
of divorce to be granted on December 3, 1991.

The trial court

waived the initial ninety-day waiting period to permit entry of the
decree of divorce, based upon two letters from the defendant's
health

care

providers.

Subsequently,

on

July

30, 1992, the

defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

POINT I.

In

her

DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A MENTAL
ILLNESS SUCH THAT A DEFAULT WAS
IMPROPER.
brief,

the

plaintiff

takes

exception

with

the

description that the defendant suffered from a mental illness or
defect at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce. However,
plaintiff's argument wholly ignores the fact that the defendant had
been awarded Social Security disability benefits prior to the entry
of the decree, and that the Social Security Administration had
required that a conservator be appointed, not the plaintifff
3

to

administer

the

Administration.

funds

received

from

the

Social

Security

It flies in the face of logic to assume that the

Social Security Administration would award benefits, and then
require that a representative payee receive the benefits in behalf
of the defendant, if defendant were deemed capable of managing his
own affairs.
Further, the health care providers for the defendant filed
reports with the trial court, to support a waiver of the initial
ninety-day waiting period, describing very alarming conduct on the
part of the defendant.

The letter from the medical doctor

describes the defendant as "an admitted alcoholic who now drinks
one pint of liquor per day according to his account.

He has

exhibited erratic and aggressive behavior in the recent past.

He

has damaged his hands from punching walls in the recent past in
testimony to this behavior."

The letter from Rick Hansen, a

physician's assistant, also describes Mr. Scafide as drinking
excessively, and refers Mr. Scafide for mental health counseling
for treatment. All of these descriptions are of an individual who
may very well not be competent to act in his own behalf, on the
face of the documents. (These medical reports are included as part
of the appendix hereto.)
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside
a decree of divorce entered in the face of this kind of evidence
4

about the defendant's health and mental state at the time of entry
of the decree.
Plaintiff
manifestations

alleges

in

of alarm

her

brief

or concern

that

there

. . . raised

were

"no

about the

defendant's assertion to his health care providers that his divorce
was uncontested."

An uncontested divorce is a far cry from a

divorce in which an individual is not represented by any legal
counsel. Moreover, it is not the duty of health care providers to
know or understand the law or the legal system, or to provide legal
advice to their patients.

It would be unusual, rather than the

norm, for a health care provider to interject a legal opinion in a
legal proceeding.
Plaintiff asserts that the defendant's representation of
himself at a trial arising from a DUI arrest in Moab, Utah,
subsequent to the decree of divorce, is evidence of his competency.
What plaintiff has failed to relate to the Court is that the
defendant's representation of himself in that criminal matter
resulted in a finding of guilty and substantial penalties, and was
probably very ill-advised.

POINT II. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
PERPETRATED A FRAUD UPON DEFENDANT
AND THE COURT.
Plaintiff, both in the trial court and in her appellate brief,
5

strenuously denies that she engaged in any scheme to defraud
defendant to persuade him to sign a stipulation for an uncontested
divorce.

She contended in the trial court and contends to this

court that she and the defendant have led "separate lives" for a
significant period of time, and that they did not continue to act
as husband and wife after entry of the Decree of Divorce.
In support of her position, the plaintiff has submitted to the
trial court an addendum containing her trial court affidavit in
opposition to her motion for summary judgment.

To this she has

attached only the last page of the parties' lease with the landlord
in Colorado, showing that the plaintiff signed the lease. She has
failed to attach the front page of the lease because it would
reflect that the lease was held in the names of both parties. The
entire lease agreement, together with the "pet rider" signed by
both parties, is attached to the defendant's affidavits in the
trial court and is a part of the court record.

It shows that

plaintiff and defendant had housing together months after the
decree.
Though she contends that the defendant and she did not live
together as husband and wife, plaintiff, in her own brief, admits
the following:
a.

that the parties both moved to Colorado immediately

after the decree of divorce.
6

(Plaintiff's brief at page 6 ) ;

and
b.

that the plaintiff's name appeared upon the lease

agreement for residential property leased in the names of both
parties

after

the

entry

of

the

decree

of

divorce.

(Plaintiff's brief at page 7); and
c.

that the defendant purchased real estate in Colorado

after the entry of the decree of divorce herein, and then
conveyed title from himself to both of these parties as joint
tenants with full rights of survivorship (plaintiff's brief at
page 6); and
d.

that

the

defendant

continued

to be

listed

as

plaintiff's husband and as an insured party on her medical
insurance after the decree of divorce (though defendant claims
she

notified

her

employer

that

she

was

divorced) .

(Plaintiff's brief at page 6); and
e. that the parties had

joint bank accounts which

continued to be held in the names of both parties after the
entry of the decree of divorce.

(Plaintiff does not admit,

apparently, that she continued to use both joint accounts.
However, she wrote a check on the "defendant's" joint account
months after the decree of divorce was entered.)

A copy of

this check was submitted to the trial court as an attachment
to plaintiff's affidavits, and is a part of the addendum to
7

this brief.
It is totally illogical for the plaintiff to assert that the
defendant is lying about the representations made to him regarding
the divorce and the nature of the parties7 relationship after the
divorce, in the face of all the independent evidence about the
plaintiff's actual conduct after the decree, in allowing defendant
to interact with her substantially as a spouse would.
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that she has brought an
action for a restraining order against the defendant in the state
of Colorado.

It should be noted that all of these Colorado

restraining order actions were commenced after June 1993, when
defendant was advised for the first time that the plaintiff
actually intended to be divorced from him, and to separate from
him.

There was no indication of any altercation between these

parties until the "true divorce" occurred, exactly as the defendant
says it did, in the summer of 1993 and not in 1992.

POINT III. THE DEFENDANTS MOTION
IS NOT TIME BARRED.
It is true that most of the basies for relief from a judgment
under Rule 60(b) require that motions be filed within ninety days
of the date of entry of the decree.

However, Rule 60(b) clearly

authorizes a court to relieve a party from a judgment, in the
interests of justice, beyond a three month waiting period.
8

In the

Corporon & Williams
A Professional

Corporation

Attorneys at Law
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Kellie F. Williams
Mary C. Corporon
M. Joy Jelte
Terry R. Spencer, Ph.D.

Telephone (801) 328-1162
Facsimile (801) 363-8243

May 1 ,

1994

MAY 0 2 IS£4
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East, #400

Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

84102

Scafide v, Scafide, Lower Court Case No. 914903785DA
Appeals Court Case No. 930276CA

Greetings:
This letter is in regard to the appellant's reply brief in the
above-referenced matter filed with the Utah Court of Appeals on
April 29, 1994.
On page 8 of the reply brief, in the last line before Point
II., the language should be: "in the summer of 1992 and not in
1991." On page 9, the last line of second paragraph, the date
should read "July 1992," not July 1993.
Thank you.
Sincerely,

:ORPORON
MCC:keg
cc:

Jim Scafide

instant case, the plaintiff is alleged to have perpetrated a fraud
as follows:

she concocted an explanation for wanting a divorce,

other than a desire to terminate her relationship with the
defendant; she obtained

defendant's

stipulation

to

a "sham"

divorce; she knew defendant had a mental or emotional illness; she
strung the defendant along for six months after the entry of the
decree of divorce, acting as though she intended to continue with
their relationship as husband and wife; and finally, she terminated
the relationship by obtaining a restraining order in Colorado, and
eventually married a third party (whom she had previously known in
Utah) in Colorado in July 1993.
Defendant acknowledges that there is a need for finality of
judgments.

However, it is not in the interests of justice to

permit someone to perpetrate a fraud upon an opposing party, to
prevent them from filing a motion for relief from judgment or
taking action to defend themselves for three months, and then to
leave the aggrieved party without any legal remedy.
Plaintiff, in her brief, asserts that defendant's case is
merely a situation of "sour grapes" and dissatisfaction with an
earlier stipulation.

In support of her case, plaintiff cites the

decision in Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Company, 817 P. 2d 382
(Ut. App. 1991).

In that case, Chipman argued that he had

mistakenly entered into an ill-advised stipulation without fully
9

understanding its consequences. The court applied the three month
time limit in which to bring an action under Rule 60(b).

These

facts are not consistent with and are highly distinguishable from
the facts in the case now at bar.

In the instant case, not only

does the defendant claim that he entered into an ill-advised
stipulation without fully understanding its consequences, but the
defendant claims that he was mentally ill and/or impaired at the
time of the stipulation. This is a fact not present in the Chipman
case.

Further, defendant

contends

here

that

the

plaintiff

affirmatively made an attempt to defraud defendant, to avoid his
bringing an action to set aside the decree until after his time
limits had long passed. Again, this is a factor not present in the
Chipman case.
Plaintiff takes exception with the defendant's assertion that
Utah law specifically recognizes that a party's fraud upon the
court

in obtaining

judgment may constitute

a unique

set of

circumstances under which the court may need to consider the
party's conduct outside the time limits of Rule 60(b).

Plaintiff

takes exception to this, but wholly ignores the language of Rule
60(b) contained in the last section of that paragraph, which reads
as follows:
. . . This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for
10

fraud upon the court. . . .
This section of Rule 60(b) must be given independent interpretation
and meaning by the Court.

It simply cannot be identical to the

provisions of Rule 60(b)(1) through Rule 60(b)(7), or there would
be no point in including this sentence as a separate portion of the
Rule.

When Rule 60(b) states that the Rule "does not limit" the

power of a court, it must mean that the time limits set forth in
the

preceding

portion

of

the

paragraph

are

not

necessarily

applicable in the case of fraud. That should be the interpretation
of this Court, and the application of the Rule to the facts of this
particular case.
The Utah Supreme Court has held, in a case substantially
similar to the facts of the instant case, that it was an abuse of
discretion for a trial court to fail to set aside a decree of
divorce.

In Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P. 2d 928 (Ut. 1980), the Utah

Supreme Court considered a fact situation wherein a decree of
divorce was entered pursuant to a stipulation and a motion for
relief from judgment was subsequently filed.

In her motion for

relief from judgment, the plaintiff in the Boyce action averred
that she had stipulated to a decree of divorce, on the basis of
information supplied to her by her former husband, that her husband
had been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation and misconduct in
relation to the divorce action, and that she was entitled to relief
11

from judgment.

The trial court there denied the motion to set

aside the decree of divorce.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed on

appeal, finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in
refusing to grant the wife's motion.

The court found as follows:

A liberal standard for application of
Rule 60(b) in divorce cases is justified by
the doctrine of the continuing jurisdiction
that a court has over its decrees. Clearly, a
court should modify a prior decree when the
interests of equity and fair dealing with the
court and the opposing party so require.
Although the trial court displayed great
patience in dealing with this case, we cannot
avoid the conclusion, on the basis of the
contentions before this Court, that an
injustice may have been perpetrated by
defendant's actions. . . .
The Supreme Court reversed

the trial court's denial of

plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion and remanded for reconsideration of
the issues of property settlement, alimony and child support.
The Boyce decision is the case from this jurisdiction most
like the facts presently before this Court.

This Court is

compelled by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Boyce, and
by the requirements of justice and equity, to set aside the
judgment and decree entered against defendant.

12

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
Defendant/appellant respectfully requests this Court to order
the plaintiff to pay the costs and actual attorney's fees incurred
herein.

The

plaintiff

has

attempted

to

defendant's mental state, and to defraud him.

take

advantage of

Defendant has been

required to expend a considerable amount of time, energy and effort
to defend himself in this action, and plaintiff should be ordered
to pay defendant's expenses.

CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant
defendant relief from the decree of divorce pursuant to Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The lower court abused its

discretion in the face of defendant's pro se status, his alcoholism
and mental condition which were of record before the court, and the
allegations of fraud set out in his affidavits in support of his
motion for relief from judgment.
The defendant respectfully urges this Court to apply the
decision in Boyce f supra, and to remand this matter for trial upon
issues of property distribution, debt distribution, alimony and
child support in the trial court.

Further, defendant requests an

award of attorney's fees for this appeal.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April, 1994

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused
the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to be served upon plaintiff by mailing
two true and correct copy of the same in an envelope, postage prepaid, and addressed to:
CAROLYN DRISCOLL
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
8 East Broadway, #735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the

day of

, 1994.
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To Whom It May Concern:
James Scafide was in 9-9-91 for a complete history and
physical with me. During this time he did relate, to me
a history of alcohol abuse. He stated that he drinks 3
to 4 pints of liquor per week in order to obliterate
the pain he suffers from a work injury, sustained March
of 1987. Mr. Scafide states he has been drinking this
way for 3 to 4 years now. I have suggested to Mr.
Scafide mental health counseling for treatment.
Mr. Scafide has signed a consent for release of this
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